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1In the hills above the Casino du Liban, in the predominantly Maronite 
Catholic Keserwan district of Lebanon, sits El Rancho, a Texas- style 
dude ranch that hosts the Cedar Stampede Rodeo, a Sunday Texas bar-
beque, eve ning campfires, and deluxe lodging in “genuine” Sioux Indian 
tepees. El Rancho is a tourist destination in which visitors, some of whom 
may be both Lebanese and American, re create a mythic U.S. frontier, a 
landscape populated by images of cowboys and American Indians made 
pop u lar in globalized U.S. culture. El Rancho promises visitors “an au-
then tic Tex- Mex experience,” where they can “set off on a dude ranch 
escape.” For Lebanese and regional visitors who may not know the mean-
ing of the term “dude ranch,” the El Rancho website provides ample 
definition and examples. According to its advertising, “El Rancho Leba-
non is modeled on the history of ranching in the United States, a his-
tory that can be accessed through the iconography of the ‘wild west’ made 
pop u lar in the Hollywood Western.” Visitors can go to El Rancho to in-
dulge in Angus beef hamburgers imported from the United States in a 
restaurant that re creates a western saloon, with John Wayne parapher-
nalia. Moreover, visitors can walk through a re created western town filled 
with wooden statues of cowboys and forlorn images of defeated, but 
noble, Indians.1
El Rancho is a private venture owned by a Lebanese businessperson, 
but the U.S. consulate and several U.S.- based corporations such as Baskin- 
Robbins and Krispy Kreme sponsor some of its activities, including the 
annual Cedar Stampede Rodeo. In this sense, although El Rancho is a 
private Lebanese venture, it is connected to the United States not only 
 because it features a version of U.S.— Tex- Mex— culture but also  because 
it receives authenticity through occasional sponsorship of the  U.S. 
consulate.
Although El Rancho promises an au then tic Tex- Mex experience, its 
symbols and icons have been reor ga nized and shuffled so that vari ous 
particularities of western U.S. expansion are confused. The advertised 
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Totem pole with cowboy hat announcing the turn- off to El Rancho, Ghodras, 
Lebanon. Photo taken by Alex Lubin.
Photos of John Wayne and Johnny Cash on the wall at El Rancho’s “western” 
saloon, where Angus beef hamburgers are imported from the United States. 
Photo taken by Alex Lubin.
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“Sioux Indian Teepees,” for example, might be found in the Northern 
Plains of the United States, but not in the U.S.– Mexico borderlands. 
Moreover, the activities available at El Rancho are not exclusively related 
to the mythical U.S. west. Among the activities advertised on the El Ran-
cho website are “Espionage Wars” or “Roman Games.” This mish- mash 
of seemingly random cultural activities pres ents a mediated vision of 
American culture, inaccurate in its history and geography but compel-
ling in its iconography, disassociated from its original referent.
What makes El Rancho so fascinating is not only how U.S. culture 
travels internationally and is received in non- U.S. destinations but also 
how American culture circulates between and within complex geopo-
liti cal realities. The United States relationship with Lebanon is currently 
tense, as Hez bollah— a po liti cal party the United States regards as a 
terrorist organ ization— controls many areas of the Lebanese government. 
Moreover, Lebanon’s capitol, Beirut, was the scene of a major U.S. mili-
tary defeat, as U.S. forces intending to intervene in Lebanon’s bloody 
civil war came  under attack in 1983. Following the bombing of the U.S. 
marine barracks in Beirut, in which 299 American and French soldiers 
died, President Ronald Reagan prevented all direct, nonstop flights from 
Lebanon to the United States, a ban that continues to this day. More-
over, U.S. support for successive Israeli military occupations and attacks 
in Lebanon has only escalated Lebanese criticism of U.S. foreign policy. 
During the last two de cades of the twentieth  century Lebanon had been 
the scene of covert U.S. military intervention as well as kidnappings and 
assassinations of U.S. diplomats and American citizens. Given the thorny 
realities of U.S.– Lebanese geopolitics, it is even more curious why Amer-
ican culture circulates so prominently in Lebanon at places like El Ran-
cho. Why would the American frontier play such a prominent role in a 
Lebanese tourist venue at a time when U.S. foreign policy is  under in-
tense Lebanese scrutiny?
Within the United States, the western frontier my thol ogy thrives as 
well. It sutures together stories of cowboys and Indians in sparsely pop-
ulated western landscapes with an  imagined past— one that is used to ex-
plain who Americans are (or are not) as “a  people” and often to hide the 
way this past is tied to a legacy of settler vio lence that underwrites much 
of the United States’ national development. But what might  these  things 
mean in Lebanon? Perhaps the U.S. west represents something altogether 
diff er ent. It might signify how icons of American culture circulate in the 
Arab world, but it might also mean something about the borders and 
Ste reo typical American Indian statue holding cedar branch (the symbol of 
Lebanon) inside El Rancho, Lebanon. Photo taken by Alex Lubin.
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frontiers of Lebanon or about the location of colonized “reservations”— 
Palestinian refugee camps— within Lebanon’s borders.
Perhaps El Rancho is rooted to a genealogy of American exceptional-
ism intended to elide the legacy of conquest in the making of American 
culture and to a Lebanese desire for a (translated) version of Ameri-
can frontiers. Beyond the influence of the United States, El Rancho as-
sumes many meanings as American culture gets reconstituted in ways 
that make tenuous its cultural and material referents. Hence,  there is 
both something especially American and something foreign to Amer-
i ca that El Rancho Lebanon is attempting to market and that the U.S. 
embassy is occasionally willing to sponsor. The seeming chaotic pastiche 
of El Rancho Lebanon might expose the contradictions inherent to both 
states and in this way becomes something that resides beyond any one 
nation. In its travels, American culture gets translated in ways that reveal 
the po liti cal unconscious of both its location of origin and its arrival 
destination.
American Studies Encounters the  Middle East attempts to understand the 
dense and overlapping global cultural pro cesses that make El Rancho in-
telligible as well as the complex narratives El Rancho tells about the 
United States and about globalized American culture. We are interested 
in how U.S. culture travels and the curious ways that notions of “Amer-
i ca” transform in the pro cess of international and global circulation. 
Moreover, in this collection, we are interested in how American culture 
circulates in the  Middle East and North Africa within changing geopo-
liti cal contexts. We therefore focus our analy sis on the historical encoun-
ters, especially of the  Middle East in Amer i ca in the making of early 
American culture as well as the con temporary encounter as it is  shaped 
in the context of changing U.S. global prestige and po liti cal realities 
across the Arab world.  These are topics that have renewed currency in 
the pres ent moment given the changing geopo liti cal relationship of 
United States to the  Middle East in par tic u lar.
El Rancho is but one example of the ways that cultural meanings are 
produced through movement, travel, and media— the Hollywood western 
being a relevant and familiar example in this case—as the idea of Amer i ca 
is translated by and for Lebanese audiences. Yet, like all travel, cultural 
flows move within par tic u lar and shifting geopo liti cal topographies. It was 
the  great contribution of Birmingham cultural studies scholars to illus-
trate how culture and material conditions are dialectically related in 
ways that suggest culture as a site of negotiation of material politics and 
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not merely a reflection of repre sen ta tion. And yet, despite the impor-
tant influence of Birmingham cultural studies over the discipline of 
American cultural studies, and despite the internationalist bent and trans-
national approach of leading figures like Stuart Hall and Paul Gilroy, 
questions of international geopolitics and U.S. foreign relations—in the 
 Middle East, especially— have been largely overlooked by the disci-
pline (and  were sometimes relegated to postcolonial theory, a formation 
that U.S. cultural studies has tended to keep at an arm’s length). As a re-
sult, and despite the avowedly anti- exceptionalist bent of American 
studies since at least the 1970s, the field remains largely rooted to an ex-
ceptionalist framework in which knowledge about the United States 
produced within the United States remains a privileged vantage point.2
Our goal with this collection is not merely to continue the ongoing 
pro cess of internationalizing American studies approaches by including 
non- U.S. scholars and viewpoints but rather, by featuring multidisci-
plinary perspectives on the Arab– U.S. relation from scholars based in 
both the  Middle East and the United States, we aim to place the disci-
pline in transit in order to explore how cultural forms circulate transna-
tionally and are  shaped by and contribute to international geopo liti cal 
contexts. In par tic u lar, we seek to understand the possibilities of Amer-
ican studies during a moment of profound geopo liti cal transformation 
and during a historical conjuncture we identify by the end of the “Amer-
ican  Century” and the ongoing social upheaval of the so- called Arab 
Spring. This is a conjuncture dominated by global economic and po liti-
cal crises that have momentous implications for the  Middle East and pose 
unique challenges to scholars attempting to understand the meaning 
of U.S. economic, military, and cultural power.
The internationalization of the discipline of American studies is not 
new, having its roots in the earliest years of the institutionalization of 
the field. Throughout the 1950s as American studies programs  were form-
ing across the American acad emy, similar programs  were formed in al-
lied Eu ro pean countries. American studies institutes at Salzburg and 
Bologna led to the formation of a Eu ro pean American studies center in 
the mid-1950s. By 1964 the Fulbright- Hayes Act instituted an American 
studies international exchange program that helped foster university 
exchanges and American studies lecturers abroad, especially in allied 
Western Eu ro pean countries. Alongside the Fulbright program, the 
United States Information Agency (USIA) spread American history and 
culture as cultural diplomacy, and in this way the spread of the discipline 
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of American studies would be carefully managed alongside efforts to 
spread an image of American power. American studies programs emerged 
in allied countries as a means to consolidate U.S. power over “the West,” 
even as scholars within international American studies centers brought 
their own interests and agendas to the proj ect.3
The internationalization of the field of American studies did not in-
clude the  Middle East  until 1998, however, when the first American stud-
ies program was launched at the University of Bahrain. By this time, the 
Cold War was over and the U.S. military presence across the  Middle East 
was escalating. American studies programs once again  were seen as use-
ful platforms for cultural diplomacy, but the context for the post– Cold 
War internationalization of the field was significantly diff er ent than it 
was during the Cold War for a  couple reasons. First, American studies 
entered the  Middle East at a time when it was difficult to export an ex-
ceptionalist vision of American benevolence. The American studies pro-
gram in Bahrain, for example, opened just two years following the 
formation of a permanent military base in Bahrain, and in this way 
American studies programs in the region would always be shadowed by 
the presence of the U.S. military.
Moreover, American studies programs emerged in the  Middle East in 
places where an increasing pop u lar and intellectual skepticism about the 
primacy of American power went hand- in- hand with official closeness 
to U.S. foreign policy. Following the formation of the State Department– 
sponsored program for American studies in Bahrain  were the formation 
of programs at the University of Jordan and in East Jerusalem, at Al- Quds 
University.  These programs, like the one at Bahrain, would have a spe-
cific mandate to educate a moderate leadership favorable to U.S. inter-
ests, including the interests of such U.S. allies as Israel, Jordan, and the 
Gulf monarchies. Still, it would be increasingly difficult to exert the 
tutelary power of American empire in  these geographies given how 
American support for Israel would increasingly be identified as a key cul-
prit in the instability of the region, especially in places where  there 
 were large numbers of Palestinian refugees.
While the Palestine question was largely taboo within American stud-
ies in the United States, at least  until very recently, across the Arab re-
gion the question of Palestine was formative of regional understandings 
of American culture and power. As a result of the preeminent role of 
the Palestine question across the  Middle East and its relative absence 
within the State Department vision of the field, a widening chasm di-
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vided the vision of the discipline from the U.S. State Department and 
regional prac ti tion ers across the  Middle East. Like the folklore of the 
Hollywood western depicted in El Rancho Lebanon, American studies 
across the  Middle East would be its own discipline, sometimes working 
in opposition to the State Department mandate of its donors.4
The particularities of the internationalization of American studies 
into the  Middle East in conjunction with the changing fortunes and pre-
eminence of the United States in the region raises impor tant questions 
about the relationship of knowledge production to geopo liti cal power 
as well as about the possibilities of American studies as an intellectual 
proj ect that can be distinct from U.S. empire. Popu lar protest against eco-
nomic in equality, social discrimination, and po liti cal repression have 
swept the globe from Wisconsin to Greece, from Israel to Rus sia, from 
Spain to New York, culminating with the Arab uprisings that have rad-
ically transformed Arab politics. In the United States, fierce  battles over 
the social contract enacted during the New Deal, intense strug gles over 
immigration and ethnic studies, and or ga nized protest movements to re-
sist neoliberal  labor and social relations focus attention on new subjects 
with new social imaginaries. In the Arab world, unlikely alliances of 
Islamist and secular activists have dislodged autocrats entrenched in 
power for de cades while new fault lines emerge in the spaces made un-
livable by de cades of foreign intervention and military invasions. Though 
oceans apart,  these strug gles have in common the search for  human dig-
nity in po liti cal and economic contexts that put power and resources in 
the hands of the few.
In the wake of the Arab uprisings and at the twilight of the Ameri-
can  Century, American Studies Encounters the  Middle East contributes to a 
deeper understanding of the ways that geopo liti cal and academic bor-
ders of all kinds are malleable, socially constructed, and historically con-
tingent. The primary subjects of the collection, Amer i ca and the  Middle 
East– North Africa (MENA), are themselves shifting imaginaries. 
Historically, culturally, po liti cally, eco nom ically, and demographi-
cally, Amer i ca is in MENA and MENA is in Amer i ca. Moreover, so-
cial movements and strug gles shaking Amer i ca and MENA (including 
the Tea Party formation, the Occupy movement, and the Arab upris-
ings) have global ramifications; therefore, it is intellectually productive 
to shift the analytical borders of Amer i ca and MENA by integrating the 
“Amer i cas” or the Islamic “worlds” in a broader terrain that includes 
Africa, Asia, Eu rope, and Latin Amer i ca. The transnational American 
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studies conjured up in our book explicates the multiple and mutual en-
tanglements of “Amer i ca” and the “ Middle East.”
American Studies Encounters the  Middle East addresses two related areas 
of American Studies scholarship: First, the collection aims to historicize 
the po liti cal, social, and cultural encounters that have taken place be-
tween the United States and MENA. Modalities of interaction including 
missionary work, “public diplomacy,” lethal drones, and hip- hop reflect 
a historically deep, po liti cally unsettled, and culturally complicated en-
counter between the United States and the Arab world. Second, by 
counterposing the Arab Spring to the American  Century, this volume 
pushes for critical engagement with the trope of the “American  Century” 
and attendant notions. It is well known that the discipline of American 
studies emerged within the context of the Cold War and the ascendancy 
of U.S. global supremacy. Since the fall of the Soviet system, however, 
the discipline finds itself confronting an American empire without a 
geopo liti cal rival, with declining geopo liti cal influence globally yet 
enduring economic, military, and cultural supremacy. The American 
 Century has come to an end as the United States finds itself in a debili-
tating condition of permanent war (against terrorism) and declining 
economic  futures. Since the  Middle East is a primary locus of the exer-
cise of American warfare, examining the Arab– U.S. encounter promises 
to shed critical light on how both sides of the relationship view them-
selves and one another.
What scholarly interventions might the end of the American  Century 
require? This volume argues for a continued push by American studies 
 toward a transnational approach that is not merely “postnationalist” as 
John Carlos Rowe advocated, but that is truly global, in this case, by a full 
inclusion of the voices and approaches of scholars writing from North 
Amer i ca, the  Middle East, and elsewhere.5 American Studies Encounters the 
 Middle East therefore takes as its subject the complex history and pres ent 
of U.S. engagement with MENA in order to exemplify a diff er ent sort of 
American studies committed equally to the study of the transnational cir-
culation of American culture outside the United States and to the circula-
tion of other cultures in the American cultural imaginary.
The American  Century
Before tracing the possibilities of American studies in the post– American 
 Century, it is necessary to review how the American  Century helped es-
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tablish the current conjecture at the beginning of the second de cade of 
the twenty- first  century. In 1941 Henry Luce, the prolific owner of Life 
magazine, published his influential essay, “The American  Century,” in 
which he defined the contours of the post– World War II era. Writing 
before U.S. entry into World War II, Luce argued that the United States 
was poised to become a global leader within the West and that the na-
tion had an indispensable, if not providential, role to play in global af-
fairs. Luce sought to sway the U.S. government into joining World War II 
and to argue against the perceived isolationism of the Roo se velt admin-
istration.  Were the United States to enter the war and replace Eu ro pean 
allies within the Atlantic world for economic and geopo liti cal primacy, 
it would be poised to assume the mantle of global leadership through 
Amer i ca’s unique ability to combine  free markets with  free  peoples.
It is for Amer i ca and for Amer i ca alone to determine  whether a 
system of  free economic enterprise—an economic order compatible 
with freedom and pro gress— shall or  shall not prevail in this 
 century. . . .  We have to decide  whether or not we  shall have for 
ourselves and our friends freedom of the seas— the right to go with 
our ships and our ocean- going airplanes where we wish, when we 
wish and as we wish. The vision of Amer i ca as the principal guaran-
tor of the freedom of the seas, the vision of Amer i ca as the dynamic 
leader of world trade, has within it the possibilities of such enor-
mous  human pro gress as to stagger the imagination. Let us not be 
staggered by it. Let us rise to its tremendous possibilities.6
Combined with the United States’ ability to protect and spread the  free 
market and, hence, global freedom, according to Luce, was the United 
States’ exceptional ability to value self- determination in the international 
sphere and to re spect the rule of law.
Although the values of  free markets and  free socie ties  were promoted 
in Luce’s pop u lar magazines, the geopo liti cal realities of the American 
 Century  were articulated in the halls of Washington, where the federal 
government developed a road map to realize Luce’s vision of an Ameri-
can  Century. Following World War II, with the ascendance of the United 
States as a global power and the start of the Cold War and its bipolar 
world order, U.S. State Department officials sought to realize a vision for 
the American  Century. The National Security Council issued policy doc-
ument NSC-68 in April 1950, in which it formulated the par ameters of 
the policy of containment as both a foreign policy to limit the spread of 
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the Soviet Union beyond the borders outlined in the “Big Three” con-
ferences that ended World War II and as a domestic policy to contain 
the threat of communism within the borders of the United States; in-
deed, containment was both a domestic and a foreign policy that required 
investments in warfare abroad and po liti cal repression at home.
Yet the American  Century was  shaped by a central contradiction, one 
that was identified by the impor tant diplomatic historian from the Uni-
versity of Wisconsin, William Appleman Williams. In The Tragedy of 
American Diplomacy, Williams argued that the Cold War was merely a 
new phase in a long history of American imperial expansion. Through-
out its history, Williams argued, three sometimes complementary but 
more often- contradictory currents characterized American power. “In 
the realm of ideas and ideals,” he argued,
American policy is guided by three conceptions. One is the warm, 
generous, humanitarian impulse to help other  people solve their 
prob lems. A second is the princi ple of self- determination applied 
at the international level, which asserts the right of  every society 
to establish its own goals or objectives, and then to realize them 
internally through the means it decides are appropriate.  These two 
ideas can be reconciled; indeed, they complement each other to an 
extensive degree. But the third idea entertained by many Americans 
is one that insists that other  people cannot  really solve their prob-
lems and improve their lives  unless they go about it the same way 
as the United States.7
In this way Williams argued that U.S. foreign relations  were always 
framed through the language of benevolence and self- determination yet 
 were actually guided by a desire to ensure the reproduction of the Amer-
ican way— its system of government and economy—in non- American 
places. Williams traced this impulse to the founding of the United States, 
when he argued that the United States committed to an idea of freedom 
tied to  free enterprise, and American futurity tied to expanding mar-
kets and control of trade routes and infrastructure. Therefore, accord-
ing to Williams, the Cold War was not a new formation but rather a 
continuation of American foreign relations that  were characterized by 
a central contradiction. The United States would be committed to a 
bounded national landscape and a boundless marketplace;  these commit-
ments, argued Williams, would inevitably produce turmoil and eventually 
undermine the American  Century.8 “Seen in an historical perspective, 
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therefore, what we are accustomed to call the Cold War,” Williams ar-
gued, “is in real ity only the most recent phase of a more general conflict 
between the established system of western capitalism and its internal and 
external opponents.”9
Following World War II the United States gained economic and mil-
itary control of the Atlantic world, including a seat at the head of the 
economic order established in the Bretton Woods agreements as well as 
a preeminent role in the newly formed international system enshrined 
by the United Nations and its Security Council. The 1945 Bretton Woods 
agreement that tied the global economy to gold and to U.S. notes helped 
the United States secure economic control within the West over Eu ro-
pean redevelopment plans. Japan and Eu rope rebuilt, often using dol-
lars and purchasing U.S. goods. Moreover, the United States owned over 
half of the world’s official gold reserves—574 million ounces at the end 
of World War II— ensuring that an international economic system would 
orbit around the United States.10
Throughout the first three de cades of the Cold War and following 
the Korean War, the United States wielded its military supremacy over the 
developing world by waging proxy wars, secret wars, and counterinsur-
gency wars across the Third World in an effort both to push back the 
gains of socialist and communist or ga ni za tion and to expand existing, and 
to open new, American markets. Yet by the 1970s the Atlantic proj ect 
was wearing thin; the United States was embroiled in Vietnam, and  there 
was an overvaluation of the U.S. dollar— the bedrock exchange currency 
of the international monetary system. American president Richard Nixon 
broke the Bretton Woods agreement in the so- called Nixon Shock and 
brought on the era of deregulations and floating currencies.  Here Nixon 
acted unilaterally, eschewing the internationalism that had initially es-
tablished the Bretton Woods system. Nixon’s brazen move to terminate 
the Bretton Woods system was one of a series of events that led to the 
increasing concentration of monetary and geopo liti cal power in the hands 
of the United States.
The United States further wielded the international economic system 
and the institutions of international governance to its benefit by using 
the International Monetary Fund and World Bank to enact po liti cal 
changes in foreign markets through coercive lending strategies. The use 
of so- called economic shocks in places like Chile in the mid-1970s to co-
erce po liti cal change that favored U.S. economic interests demonstrated 
a concentration of economic and military power in the United States. 
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Perhaps the most significant move  toward the making of American he-
gemony took place in 1985, when Secretary of State Henry Kissinger 
helped the United States move impor tant deliberations of the United Na-
tions into the exclusive club of the UN Security Council that was then 
controlled by the three permanent members— the United States, the 
United Kingdom, and France (the P3).11
The end of the Cold War signaled the realization of American hege-
mony in economic, geopo liti cal, and military terms. By 1997 policymakers 
who had been an integral part of Reagan’s Latin Amer i ca policy, includ-
ing illegally funding Nicaraguan contras, began to articulate a proj ect for 
a new American  Century built around the idea that “American leader-
ship is good both for Amer i ca and for the world.”12 The Proj ect for the 
New American  Century was established to advocate within the admin-
istration the expansion American militarism, but it had to do so in new 
ways given that the twentieth  century’s major threat, the Soviet Union, 
was no longer available. Hence, the proj ect argued the need for signifi-
cant increases in defense spending, including funds to modernize exist-
ing armed forces. It also argued that the United States’ role in foreign 
affairs must revolve around the promotion of po liti cal and economic 
freedom abroad. And, fi nally, the Proj ect for the New American  Century 
revised for the twenty- first  century Henry Luce’s vision of American 
leadership in the world by arguing, “we need to accept responsibility for 
Amer i ca’s unique role in preserving and extending an international or-
der friendly to our security, our prosperity, and our princi ples.”13 From 
the outset, the Proj ect for the New American  Century’s leadership rec-
ommended regime change in Iraq as a means to assert American control 
of the  Middle East, its oil, and, most importantly, the global price of oil. 
The Bush administration realized that goal following 9/11 through a 
series of domestic and international actions that asserted American he-
gemony over the world. And yet, as we  will see, the fundamental con-
tradiction of American power identified by William Appleman Williams 
endures as the movement of global capitalism would come to eclipse the 
power of the United States to maintain national borders during a global 
war on terror.
 After the American  Century
The end of the American  Century and the ascendance of the global war 
on terror has produced new subject formations and subjectivities that re-
Introduction 15
quire new scholarly approaches. As George Lipsitz argues in American 
Studies in a Moment of Danger, our ways of thinking about the past and 
pres ent are  shaped in profound ways by the historical conjunctures that 
produce our scholarly approaches. American studies scholarship has 
transformed as the Cold War state that produced the field has also trans-
formed. As Lipsitz argues, “We see now, if only in retrospect, that in-
dustrialization, nationalism, and the cold war  were not just historical 
pro cesses and events— they  were also ways of knowing and being. They 
had their own logics and optics; they encouraged us to see some  things 
and prevented us from seeing  others.”14 It is in the spirit of Lipsitz’s ob-
servations about the relationship of historical context and knowledge 
production that American Studies Encounters the  Middle East asks how 
the pres ent conjunctures, including the end of the American  Century, the 
ascendance of the global war on terror, and the rise of the Arab upris-
ings produce new ways of “knowing and being.”
Against the backdrop of profound po liti cal, economic, environmen-
tal, and social local and global transformations by grounding itself in 
Arab– U.S. relations, this volume seeks to deepen the expansion of Amer-
ican studies in a global context that Giovanni Arrighi has called a “post- 
American” world.15 Scholars in vari ous disciplines have noted the relative 
decline in Amer i ca’s global power,16 and in recent years the debate spilled 
over to public debate, pitting North American pundits like Fareed Za-
karia and Robert Kagan against each other.17 International relations schol-
ars have, for some time, argued that the American empire is losing global 
influence.18 The question of Amer i ca’s place in the world remains hotly 
contested in public discourse and academic circles.
Po liti cal economists and world system theories have argued that the 
contradictions William Appleman Williams identified at the outset of 
the Cold War are not only the contradiction of po liti cal liberalism but 
are more fundamentally contradictions applicable to capitalism. Giovanni 
Arrighi and Immanuel Wallerstein, to take just two examples, have ar-
gued that the American  Century is merely the name for a stage in cap i-
tal ist development— a cycle of accumulation and surplus— that would 
inevitably decline or transform as a result of the flexibility of capital. 
They argue that beginning in the 1970s global capital has eclipsed the 
nation form as the most impor tant unit of global power. For example, 
in his forecast of the end of American hegemony, Immanuel Wallerstein 
argues that while the United States remains eco nom ically and militarily 
dominant, it no longer maintains its global prestige or its ability to dictate 
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global events as it did during the Cold War. For Wallerstein, the end of 
the American empire is partly due to replacement of the nation with the 
global financial system as well as the emergence of new economic and 
geopo liti cal rivals, particularly Japan and Germany.19
Similarly, Arrighi has argued that the end of the American  Century 
marks the decline of the American global hegemony. Arrighi reminds 
us that Antonio Gramsci’s concept of hegemony relies not only on a no-
tion of top- down dominance but also the production of consent from 
below. While the United States was hegemonic during the Cold War, 
Arrighi argues that this status has changed, particularly in the wake of 
the U.S. war on terror. Now, Arrighi argues, the United States is merely 
globally dominant while lacking the sort of global consent of U.S. rule 
that dominated during the Cold War. Importantly, Arrighi’s diagnosis 
of American geopo liti cal power is tied to his understanding of global and 
transnational cap i tal ist development.
As he argued in The Long Twentieth  Century, U.S. geopo liti cal power 
was merely a phase of cap i tal ist development rooted to the territory of 
the United States. Overaccumulation, argues Arrighi, has led the United 
States to expand territorially through war and geopo liti cal power. Yet the 
ability of the United States to expend its surplus is waning as it becomes 
more difficult for it to dictate world events in ways that  favor its eco-
nomic wishes. Moreover, Arrighi forecasts a “re- centering of the global 
po liti cal economy on East Asia” that  will further characterizes the U.S. 
“dominance without hegemony.”20
Published in 2002, a de cade before the argument moved to English- 
language outlets, Emmanuel Todd’s Après l’empire: Essai sur la décomposition 
du système américain harnessed a wealth of demographic, cultural, eco-
nomic, industrial, and military data to argue that “Amer i ca is a  great 
nation whose power has been incontestable, but whose decline appears 
irreversible.”21 Similarly, Stephen Walt, in his article “The End of the 
American Era,” argues that “when a state stands alone at the pinnacle of 
power . . .  there is nowhere to go but down.”22 Walt argues that the 
“American era” of the Cold War de cades was characterized by an inflated 
sense of peril and bi polar ity. In real ity, argues Walt, U.S. hegemony was 
secure throughout the Cold War as the United States operated without 
a serious military or economic rival. The fall of the Soviet Union, how-
ever, coupled with the decline in the U.S. economy has brought the 
American era to an end.  There are new emerging areas of geopo liti cal 
power, most prominently in Asia. Moreover, for Walt, the Arab Spring 
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most clearly demonstrates the decline of the American era, as the United 
States has been a marginal influence in developments across the MENA. 
However, Walt notes that while the American era is coming to a 
close, American power is still hegemonic; it is merely less influential. 
Hence, according to Walt,
the real question was always  whether what one might term the 
“American Era” was nearing its end. Specifically might the United 
States remain the strongest global power but be unable to exercise 
the same influence it once enjoyed? If that is the case— and I believe 
it is— then Washington must devise a  grand strategy that acknowl-
edges this new real ity but still uses Amer i ca’s enduring assets to 
advance the national interest.23
Despite forecasts of geopo liti cal decline, we do not underestimate the 
enduring hegemony of U.S. military power globally. In 2012–13, the 
United States had special operations forces (military personal who op-
erate beyond the reach of international law) covering 60  percent of the 
globe. The United States currently has no military rival. Yet, for the pur-
poses of our argument, we suggest that the ability of the United States 
to shape the course of the  future in its vision of the world order is over. 
The United States cannot speak of a “new world order”  because it can-
not shape events as it once could, or at least as it thought it could.
Moreover, the U.S. economy is no longer globally supreme, as China 
has recently surpassed the United States for the world’s largest economy. 
Perhaps most significantly, American influence is in decline—it can no 
longer dictate events across the globe in ways that it once did, and this is 
in part due to the renewed economic strength of new multilateral co-
ali tions of state that emerge from the global south, such as the BRICS 
countries (Brazil, Rus sia, India, China, South Africa), which have es-
tablished trade and other economic policy beyond the networks of U.S.- 
led neoliberal economic policy. Nowhere, we argue, is the declining 
influence of the U.S. empire more vis i ble than in the events of 2011–13 
in the Arab world, the so- called Arab uprisings or spring.
Transnational American Studies in  These Times
Transnational American studies is not merely the study of global flows 
of culture,  people, economies, and resources across national bound aries 
but also of complex geopo liti cal relations that inform the infrastructure 
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of circulation and the reception of Amer i ca beyond the United States. 
Transnational American culture is enabled by the transnationalization 
of U.S.- led global economies and hegemony. Yet, as American culture 
travels, it becomes unmoored from its origin and can signify something 
entirely diff er ent in and for a non- U.S. audience. In this way the trans-
national flow of American culture enables a critical view of American 
culture that is often occluded within the United States. To take the case 
of El Rancho Lebanon, we can see how, in the flow of the U.S. “Wild 
West” to Lebanon, we witness the unmooring of western iconography 
from the state proj ect of U.S. settler colonial expansion and its reinscrip-
tion in Lebanese national culture.
In this volume, we are interested in American studies in transit dur-
ing a geopo liti cal moment characterized by declining U.S. global influ-
ence and ubiquitous American cultural global circulation worldwide. The 
presidency of George W. Bush and his administration’s  handling of the 
September 11, 2001, attacks and their aftermath has been disastrous for 
perceptions of the United States in the Arab world.  After what appeared 
to be a promising start, the Obama administration has failed to convince 
public opinion in the  Middle East that  there have been any fundamen-
tal changes to U.S. policy  toward the region, and, if anything, drone 
strikes and support for the vio lence of regional allies like Saudi Arabia 
and Israel have only made life across MENA more precarious. The United 
States, it seems, is set on a path in its relation to the Arab world that 
is difficult to reverse. And yet, despite the enduring power of the 
United States, American prestige across the  Middle East seems to be 
in decline.
The Arab uprisings of 2011 made starkly vis i ble the declining geopo-
liti cal influence of the United States in the Arab world. This is a decline 
that began before the Arab uprisings, throughout the Cold War, with 
the unconditional aid the United States provided to Israel in the face of 
Israeli aggression in the Arab world. This support has endured even be-
yond the utility, it could be argued, of Israel as a strategic ally in the re-
gion.24 Moreover, de cades of U.S.- driven World Bank neoliberal lending 
has created vast prob lems of poverty and hopelessness across much of the 
Arab region well before the January 25, 2011, protests. Although the up-
risings are directed against authoritarian regimes and not the United 
States,  there is evidence that protesters saw the strug gle against authori-
tarian rule as a means to reject the U.S.- dominated economic and mili-
tary order.25
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If U.S. prestige in MENA has been in decline since 1948, but espe-
cially since Oslo neoliberalism,26 it was arguably the recent United States 
votes against recognizing Palestinian statehood in the United Nations 
that signaled the end of an American- dominated era in the region. The 
United States recently voted for the second time in two years against rec-
ognition of a Palestinian state in the United Nations. It stood with nine 
other countries over which it has economic and military control. Strik-
ing in the vote is that the United States can no longer count on Eu ro-
pean allies to stand against the Arab world— although some Eu ro pean 
allies chose to abstain from the vote. Moreover, while the Eu ro pean 
Union has begun to consider a boycott of Israeli settlement- produced 
goods, the United States remains firmly committed to its Israel policy, 
even  after the alarming devastation brought on by successive invasions 
of Gaza.
 After the U.S.- orchestrated and - led invasions of Iraq and Af ghan i-
stan and the many scandals of the George W. Bush presidency— Abu 
Ghraib, Guantanamo, torture, rendition— the Obama presidency was ini-
tially perceived as a radical shift in U.S. policy  toward the  Middle East. 
Obama’s famous June 4, 2009, Cairo speech raised expectations that 
a fundamentally new U.S. approach to the MENA region was afoot. 
Within months, however, the Arab press began echoing rising public sen-
timents that the change was one of style, not substance. The Obama 
administration’s calculated response to the Arab uprisings, however cau-
tious, angered both revolutionary forces, who lamented U.S. hy poc risy 
on democracy and  human rights, and counterrevolutionary rollback led 
by Saudi Arabia, irate at Obama’s abandonment of longtime U.S. and 
Saudi ally Hosni Mubarak. Continued U.S. support for Israeli policies, 
Obama’s escalation of drone warfare, and the administrations flagrant 
disregard for the Bahraini uprising dashed any remaining illusions about 
changes in U.S.– Middle East policies. The U.S. administration’s initially 
timid rapprochement with Iran and rumors of a pending nuclear deal, 
in addition to Obama’s not- so- red “red line” on chemical weapons use 
in Syria, transformed disappointment with U.S. policies to anger and op-
position among steadfast allies in the Gulf Cooperation Council, led by 
Saudi Arabia. Columns with titles such “Amer i ca’s Weakness and Its 
Crisis” and “Who Is Responsible for Decline in U.S. Influence in the 
World?” have proliferated in the Arab— and even Israeli— press.27
If the 2003 invasion of Iraq signaled the apex of U.S. power, the Arab 
uprisings have since their onset in late 2010 confirmed the decline of 
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American global might. The United States government appeared more 
blindsided by the swift toppling of Zine El Abidine Ben Ali in Tunisia 
than embarrassed by a WikiLeaks document revealing the chumminess 
of Ben Ali’s autocracy with Western governments.  After much dither-
ing in Egypt over Mubarak, the Obama administration announced it was 
ceasing its support to longtime U.S. ally Hosni Mubarak and has since 
then followed a road of inconsistency and ambiguity in dealing with 
Mubarak’s successors, Mohamed Morsi of the Muslim Brotherhood and 
Abdel Fattah El- Sisi of the military. On Libya, the administration “led 
from  behind,” essentially assisting while the French and British took the 
lead in North Atlantic Treaty Or ga ni za tion efforts to help rebels against 
Muammar Gaddafi, but in the wake of Gaddafi’s deposition, vio lence and 
po liti cal instability in Libya has only escalated. In Syria, rhetorical con-
demnation of Bashar al- Assad and lukewarm support of the rebels fu-
eled a narrative that the United States, alongside Israel, was interested 
in seeing the two sides of the Syrian conflict bleed each other out. In 
Bahrain, the administration gave lip ser vice to the rhe toric of  human 
rights while supporting Saudi- led repression of dissent. Reactive and 
seemingly ad hoc, the U.S. response to the Arab uprisings has been con-
sistently inconsistent.
It is perhaps paradoxical, then, that cultural forms developed in the 
United States, such as rap,  free- style graffiti, and  others explored in vari-
ous chapters of this volume, have flourished as modalities of protest in 
the Arab uprisings. Although rap, graffiti, and  others have received a fair 
share of attention, this pales in comparison to the hype that surrounded 
the use of social media such as Facebook, YouTube, and Twitter during 
the Arab uprisings. As Frank Rich wrote in the New York Times, “The 
talking- head invocations of Twitter and Facebook instead take the form 
of implicit, simplistic Western chauvinism. How fabulous that two 
 great American digital innovations can rescue the downtrodden, un-
washed masses.”28 The discourse privileging American technology in 
positive Arab po liti cal change has a long history in U.S. public discourse 
and harks back to Daniel Lerner’s influential book The Passing of Tradi-
tional Society (1958), which was foundational to the modernization para-
digm in international relations and comparative politics and to the 
development communication paradigm in international communication 
studies.29
The Passing of Traditional Modernity is a heuristic site to examine the 
imbrication of the  Middle East, global media research, and American em-
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pire. The book is based on approximately three hundred surveys con-
ducted in the early 1950s in Egypt, Iran, Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey, and 
Syria. Lerner identified three types of persons— the traditionalist, tran-
sitionalist, and modernist— and argued that  people moved from the first 
to the third category through empathy. The media, which depicted a 
world larger than the traditionalists’, created a desire for social mobility, 
what Lerner dubbed “psychic mobility.” As Shah writes, the book was a 
product of its time,  shaped by the forces of Cold War geopolitics (the 
book was funded by the Voice of Amer i ca to learn more about Arab me-
dia audiences to better  counter Soviet broadcasting); the rise of behav-
ioral science at U.S. research universities, which encouraged the systematic 
study of social- cultural dynamics; and the advent of racial liberalism, 
which located social change in cultural patters rather than immutable ra-
cial characteristics, which was progressive thinking for the 1950s.30 The 
Passing of Traditional Modernity has had an enduring influence on Amer-
ican perceptions of the Arab world, finding its most amplified manifes-
tation in George W. Bush’s Greater  Middle East initiative— “Modernizing 
the  Middle East,” the subtitle of Lerner’s book, echoes the Bush admin-
istration’s “Reforming the  Middle East.”
In ensuing years, the field of communication research as an academic 
discipline, like the discipline of American studies, developed a social sci-
entific epistemology adequate for its closeness to American government 
policymakers. It was made policy relevant but not intellectually autono-
mous. As Hanno Hardt wrote in a landmark essay critiquing the U.S. tra-
dition in media research:
This tradition fails to consider historical growth as an indissoluble 
pro cess that cannot be dissected into empirical parts or facts and 
prefers to treat communication and media studies in terms of a 
series of specific, isolated social phenomena. In this context, it seems 
that the field suffers not only from a cultural bias but also from a 
social scientific bias  toward searching for laws governing the 
relationship of media and society. As a result, empirical research 
techniques obscure cultural differences.31
But global media research underwent a momentous shift in the 1970s. 
The United States— state, economics, and culture— has historically had 
an enormous impact on global pop u lar culture and has featured promi-
nently in academic and public debates about cultural power and global-
ization. Influenced by a handful of radical U.S. intellectuals like Herbert 
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Schiller, whose books Mass Communication and American Empire (1971) and 
Communication and Cultural Domination (1976)  were foundational to de-
veloping a globally oriented po liti cal economy of media and informa-
tion, the “media imperialism” perspective dominated the study of global 
media and cultural flows in the 1970s.32 This approach focused on the 
politico- economic and cultural inequalities between what  were then 
known as “First,” where the United States was a dominant country, and 
“Third” Worlds. In  those years countries opposed to global U.S. media 
and cultural hegemony used meetings of the United Nations Educational, 
Scientific and Cultural Or ga ni za tion (UNESCO) to coordinate and 
publicize their grievances against Western dominance, especially against 
the United States. This led to the New World Information Order ( later 
known as the New World Information and Communication Order) 
resolution against the neoliberal “ free flow of information” doctrine, 
which UNESCO’s 1976 General Conference endorsed in Nairobi, 
 Kenya.33
Cold War geopolitics undergirded the New World Information Or-
der debate as it influenced Lerner’s work a few de cades earlier: the Rea-
gan administration and  U.S. media bitterly fought UNESCO and 
opponents of the “ free flow” doctrine. U.S. officials attacked UNESCO 
for its attempts to “control press freedom,” and Elliott Abrams, then as-
sistant secretary of state, called on UNESCO to consider the First 
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution as a template for a global policy 
regime.34 The New York Times editorialized that “if it turns out to be im-
possible to reject this attempt to tamper with our basic princi ples,  there 
is always the alternative of rejecting UNESCO itself,” and soon the 
United States and United Kingdom suspended their memberships in 
UNESCO.35 This led to the slow decline of the debate over global U.S. 
cultural influence in UNESCO, which the United States rejoined, of all 
times, during George W. Bush’s infamous “Axis of Evil” speech.
Outline of the Book
American Studies Encounters the  Middle East captures an impor tant yet 
fleeting moment in the encounter between Amer i ca and the Arab world. 
The book’s focus on this time of widespread pop u lar discontent, nor-
mative fragmentation, and economic uncertainty, in addition to adding 
historical depth to current problematics, casts the American– Arab en-
counter as the nexus for a new, transnational, global American studies 
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capable of shedding light on the momentous ongoing transformations. 
The book is or ga nized in two sections.
The first section of the book, “The Arab– U.S. Encounter: Entangled 
Histories and Con temporary Flows,” features chapters on historical link-
ages and transborder exchanges between the United States and the Arab 
world from the eigh teenth to the twenty- first centuries. The six chap-
ters in this section demonstrate the breadth and depth of Amer i ca’s his-
torical Arab entanglements. From the place of Islam in eighteenth- century 
American lit er a ture, the fascinating journey of an Algerian in colonial 
 Virginia, together the chapters show that the U.S.– Arab encounter has 
for long haunted reading, writing, travel, politics, media and pop u lar cul-
ture. In “Diabolical Enterprises and Abominable Superstitions: Islam 
and the Conceptualization of Finance in Early American Lit er a ture,” 
Adam John Waterman explores how “Islam” operated as an impor tant 
fount of cultural imagination for the early United States, through close 
readings of several early American writings focusing on finance, nota-
bly speculation. In so  doing, he questions the dominant narrative that 
compares a long- standing Eu ro pean interaction with the  Middle East and 
Islam against a putatively and relatively recent encounter between the 
worlds of Islam and the United States. In the same vein, Judith E. Tucker 
explores an Appalachian legend in “Salim the Algerine: The Muslim 
Who Strayed into Colonial  Virginia.” The character at the heart of the 
chapter was captured in turn by Spanish pirates who took him to Amer-
i ca and sold him as a slave, then was captured by Shawnee Native Amer-
icans  after he escaped. Through this engrossing story, Tucker explores 
the role of Islam in the changing meanings of dislocation, religion, and 
identity in the early American– Arab/Ottoman encounter. In “ ‘Race’ and 
‘Blackness’ in Moroccan Rap: Voicing Local Experiences of Marginal-
ity,” Christina Moreno Almeida explores the specific dynamics of con-
nection between Moroccan and United States rap scenes, looking at how 
Moroccan rappers recruit the U.S. civil rights movement to explore the 
intricacies of their own marginality. Finding U.S. culture to be a source 
for the cultural imaginations of young Moroccan rappers, Almeida con-
cludes that “blackness” in Morocco goes beyond race to signal poverty 
and exclusion. In turn, Rayya El Zein’s “Call and Response, Radical Be-
longing and Arabic Hip- Hop in ‘the West,’ ” develops the notion of rad-
ical belonging as a “co- construction of community and identity” that 
she unravels via studying Arab hip- hop concerts in the West, identify-
ing the kinds of politics produced in  these per for mance. Focusing on 
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how U.S. rhe toric was received and critiques in Egypt, Mounira Soliman, 
in “The Reception of U.S. Discourse on the Egyptian Revolution: Be-
tween the Popu lar and the Official,” aims at understanding how U.S. 
pop u lar culture and satire, with an in ter est ing discussion of U.S. fast 
food,  shaped Egyptian perceptions of American agendas in the uprisings. 
Fi nally, in “Arab Spring, American Autumn,” Brian T. Edwards reflects 
on his own experience with American studies as a globalizing formation, 
concluding with thoughts on how the decline of U.S. influence in the 
Arab world is intertwined with the rise of Arab cultural production red-
olent with fragments of Amer i ca.
The second section of the book, “Infrastructures of Control: From 
Mythmaking to Drone Warfare” moves the discussion to a techno- 
politico- economic plane while examining the discourses under lying 
transnational infrastructures of control and warfare. Waleed Hazbun’s 
“The Uses of Modernization Theory: American Foreign Policy and 
Mythmaking in the Arab World,” elaborates a “strategic logic of mod-
ernization” that, among other  things, recruited the U.S. military as an 
agent in the modernization of the Arab world. Hazbun concludes with 
po liti cal and epistemological insights on how to better manage the Arab– 
American relation, with a note on the special role that the American 
University of Beirut can play in that pro cess. Craig Jones, in “Traveling 
Law: Targeted Killing, Lawfare, and the Deconstruction of the Battle-
field,” explores the circulation of the notion of targeted killing between 
Israel and the United States and deploys the concept of “lawfare” to ex-
plore both the “weaponization of the law” and the way law has acted as 
a discursive naturalizer of targeted killing. When one thinks of tactics 
of extra- or parajudicial assassination, drones come to mind. Ashley Daw-
son, in “Drone Executions, Urban Surveillance, and the Imperial Gaze,” 
offers a transnational and transhistorical study of imperial visuality 
beginning with the British Raj in Calcutta in the nineteenth  century, 
Algiers  under French control in the twentieth  century, and U.S. war 
videogames in the twenty- first  century, concluding that “drones are part 
of a long history of sanitizing imperial vio lence.” Fi nally, moving to the 
con temporary  Middle East, Helga Tawil- Souri, argues, in “Technology’s 
Borders: The U.S., Palestine, and Egypt’s Digital Connection,” that U.S.- 
developed and - funded technology plays a contradictory role in both 
Egypt and Palestine, underscoring the fragility of notions of “opening” 
and “borderlessness” and asserting the lingering importance of space in 
global geopolitics. In “The Counterrevolutionary Year: The Arab Spring, 
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the Gulf Cooperation Council, and U.S. Foreign Policy in the  Middle 
East,” Osamah Khalil identifies and analyzes a gap between U.S. rhe toric, 
which supported the emancipatory forces of revolution, with  actual 
U.S. actions, which supported reactionary players in counterrevolutions 
aiming to bury the Arab uprisings. He concludes with thoughts on 
American hegemony in the age of Obama.
Collectively, the chapters in American Studies Encounters the  Middle East 
are intended to provoke new questions about the  futures of American 
studies as well as the  future of American po liti cal and military engagement 
in the  Middle East. Rethinking past cultural encounters may suggest 
examples of conviviality and cohabitation across the United States and 
 Middle East that seem impossible, if not unfathomable in the pres ent. 
Moreover, taking stock of the changing nature of the United States in 
the world at the end of the American  Century and during the revolutions 
within the Arab world may suggest new possibilities for the location 
and subject of American studies.
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